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Abstract
We suggest a model derived from the well-known Mussa and Rosen's model, in which two
populations of consumers of opposite tastes co-exist: they rank in exactly the reverse order
variants sold at the same price. This model may account for linked and contradictory
characteristics in products (as for instance nutritional quality and taste), with consumers
attaching more importance to one or to the other aspect. The subgame perfect equilibrium is
fully characterized for a costless duopoly choosing qualities then prices.
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In vertical diﬀerentiation models, all consumers are supposed to rank in the same order
products sold at the same price, meaning that they all desire quality even if they are
not equally willing to pay for it. These models are appropriate to account for com-
petition between ﬁrms when no ambiguity exists on the preference of consumers for a
given characteristic. Horizontal diﬀerentiation models have the opposite feature: when
variants are sold at the same price, each consumer has a diﬀerent preferred variant.
Locational diﬀerentiation is well represented through this second type of models.
However some situations can be modelled adequately by no one of these well-known
types of models. In this paper, we are interested in situations where there exist two
linked and contradictory aspects in a product, with consumers disagreeing on the most
important one. The paper suggests a model accounting for such situations and char-
acterizes fully the subgame perfect equilibrium of the quality-then-price game for a
costless duopoly.
Consider for example environmental quality and “physical” quality. Very often
these two characteristics are linked and contradictory. We mean that to have a good
physical quality, one must have a bad environmental quality. For instance to have a
beautiful leather, chemical products, very harmful to the environment, have to be used.
It is reasonable to suppose that some consumers attach importance to the physical
quality of leather and that some of them attach importance to the environmental
dimension. The same opposition holds between the engine power in a car on the one
hand and the fuel consumption and the environmental dimension on the other hand.
A practical example is PRIUS, a car model of Toyota with a hybrid engine. Despite
a price close to the prices of more classical models in the same category (Avensis
turbodiesel for instance in the same brand1), consumers continue to buy the classical
models. Another interesting example with the same feature is food when we consider
taste and nutritional quality. Unfortunately, what is considered tasteful (for instance
pastry) is in general not good for health and consumers certainly disagree on the most
important among the two aspects.
In this paper we suggest a model derived from the well-known Mussa and Rosen’s
(1978) one to account for such situations, in which two populations of opposite pref-
erences co-exist. When variants are sold at the same price the two populations rank
them exactly in the reverse order. A costless duopoly is supposed to compete for such
a market choosing ﬁrst qualities then prices. The subgame perfect equilibrium is fully
characterized. We prove that depending on the relative importance of each population
and the potential for diﬀerentiation on each type of quality segment, three outcomes
are possible: either both ﬁrms choose to serve the same population ignoring the other,
or, each ﬁrm is specialized in one population.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 cal-
culates price equilibrium for given qualities. Section 4 deals with quality choice and
Section 5 concludes.
1The comparison made on www.Caradisiac.com between the two models showing that both have
very comparable characteristics (except for the characteristics stemming from the engine type), allows
to place them in the same category.
12 The model
The used model is an extension of the well-known model of Mussa and Rosen (1978).
Consider two competing ﬁrms i = 1,2, each choosing the quality of its product qi and
its price pi. The indirect utility function of a consumer of type θ is given by:
Uθ(qi,pi) =
(
θqi − pi if she buys one unit of product of quality qi at price pi
0 if she buys nothing
Each consumer is supposed to buy one unit of product from the ﬁrm that ensures
to her the best utility except if the alternative of no purchase is better than both.
Consumers are supposed to be uniformly distributed with a density normalized to 1,
on [θ,θ]. Qualities are chosen in [q,q].
We suppose that q < 0 and θ < 0. These are the only diﬀerences with the original
model. This implies that products sold at the same price are ranked from top to bottom
by consumers θ > 0 and in the reverse order by consumers θ < 0. (Consumer θ = 0
is indiﬀerent). Hence the model is not a vertical diﬀerentiation one since there is no
unanimity in the ranking of variants sold at the same price.
The new hypotheses imply that quality is not desirable by everybody. This is the
way we choose to account for the existence of contradictory aspects in products. To
ﬁx ideas, imagine that positive qualities correspond to products good for health and
that negative ones correspond to tasteful products. Positive θ are the consumers who
attach more importance to nutritional quality while negative θ are those who attach
more importance to taste.
For simplicity production is supposed to be costless. Firms engage in a two-step
game in which they ﬁrst choose qualities then prices.
3 Price equilibrium
We proceed by backward induction. In this section we solve the price step.
Lemma 1 For given qualities, equilibrium prices and proﬁts at equilibrium are pro-
vided in the following table.
Equilibrium prices Proﬁts at equilibrium

















































Lemma 1 provides for each couple of given qualities the price equilibrium and the
proﬁts at equilibrium. The major part of calculations exist in the literature (Chin and
Shoi 1992). In the proof provided in Appendix, calculations are given brieﬂy focusing
on diﬀerences and remarks relevant for the speciﬁed model.
24 Quality choice
We are now ready to analyze quality choice. To do so, we study the proﬁt function of
Firm i at price equilibrium w.r.t. its quality qi, for a given quality of its competitor
qj. This analysis leads ﬁrst to Lemma 2 then to Proposition 1. Proofs are given in
Appendix.
Lemma 2 The best reply of Firm i to a given qj of its competitor is necessarily either
q, q or (4/7)qj.
Lemma 2 limits the relevant set of qualities possible to be a best reply to some
quality of the competitor, which limits in the same time the equilibrium candidates.
After noting that the couples where qualities are equal cannot be equilibria, there are
three equilibrium candidates (and their mirrors) in quality terms: (q,(4/7)q), (q,q)
and (q,(4/7)q). The next proposition speciﬁes necessary and suﬃcient conditions for
each candidate to be an equilibrium.
Proposition 1 At the subgame perfect equilibrium, three outcomes are possible. They
are summarized in the table below.
Quality choice Necessary and suﬃcient condition(s)





θ2 ≤ |q/q| ≤ 12θ
2
θ2
(q,(4/7)q) |q/q| ≤ (1/12)θ
2
θ2
Qualitatively, Proposition 1 implies that three regions may be relevantly distin-
guished as |q/q| varies relatively to θ
2
θ2. For suﬃciently high |q/q|, both ﬁrms produce
negative qualities and serve partially only negative θ; positive θ are neglected by both
ﬁrms. The reverse phenomenon is observed for suﬃciently low |q/q|: only positive θ
are served and negative θ are neglected. For intermediate |q/q|, one ﬁrm produces the
lowest quality possible, serving (partially) negative θ and the other produces q serv-
ing positive θ; thus a sort of “specialization” of each ﬁrm on each type of consumers’
segment, occurs.
This result stems from a tradeoﬀ of ﬁrms between operating on an interesting
demand segment with the competitor and minimizing price competition by being alone
on a segment. This depends on the relative potential for diﬀerentiation on each type




For high values of |q/q| (Case 1), the potential for diﬀerentiation on the negative
quality segment is high relative to the positive one. Thus the relative potential for
diﬀerentiation oﬀered on the negative qualities is suﬃcient for both ﬁrms to operate on
the same segment. The reverse phenomenon is observed when |q/q| is low (Case 3), in
which case ﬁrms choose both to serve the positive segment of consumers as the relative
3potential for diﬀerentiation is suﬃcient on the positive segment of qualities. In the
intermediate case (Case 2), neither the positive segment nor the negative one oﬀers a
suﬃcient potential for diﬀerentiation and ﬁrms choose to operate on distinct segments
of qualities serving each a distinct segment of consumers. This may be seen diﬀerently





12q, ﬁrms produce qualities (q, 4







q ﬁrms produce (q,q), one of them serving negative θ and
the other positive ones.




q , ﬁrms produce (q, 4
7q) serving only positive θ.
When θ
2
θ2, the relative size of the positive segment of consumers, is too small (Case
1), the negative segment is relatively so important that ﬁrms ﬁnd it better to serve
both the negative θ behaving as if the positive one did not exist. A symmetric phe-
nomenon happens when θ
2
θ2 is too large (Case 3) meaning that the positive segment is
so important that both ﬁrms decide to serve this segment. In both cases, operating on
an interesting consumers’ segment outweighs the beneﬁt to be alone on a consumers’
segment. It is only for intermediate values of θ
2
θ2 (Case 2) that ﬁrms specialize each in a
diﬀerent segment of consumers and maximize product diﬀerentiation. In this case, the
positive and negative segments have comparable sizes, making better to be on diﬀerent
segments.
5 Conclusion
Allowing in the model of Mussa and Rosen, simply to the lower-bounds of the con-
sumers’ segment and the quality segment to be negative, provides a simple and tractable
model that accounts for a variety of interesting stylized facts in which two contradic-
tory aspects exist. Three outcomes are possible: either both ﬁrms serve the same
population ignoring the other or each one is specialized in one population.
We thus better understand why ﬁrms may choose to “ignore” some population. By a
rough intuitive approach, one may think that they should always specialize in a diﬀerent
population to maximize diﬀerentiation and be a local monopoly. This reasoning is
nevertheless valid only for populations of comparable sizes. When one population is
very large relative to the other, it becomes more proﬁtable for both to serve it and
ignore the small population. The analysis shows that the apparaisal of the relative size
of populations should be done relative to the relative potential for diﬀerentiation on
each quality segment. As a by-product the existence in a given sector of ﬁrms all of
the same type (serving the same type of consumers) does not necessarily mean that
all consumers are of that same type but imply that the size of the other population
is relatively small and/or that the relative potential for diﬀerentiation on the segment
quality corresponding to the ignored population is small.
4Above the obtained results, the model oﬀers a possibility to deepen the question of
quality choice in a new direction not explored so far. According to the adopted inter-
pretation, the model would be used diﬀerently. Interpreted in terms of environmental
and physical qualities, the question of setting up an eco-label or some other regulating
policy may be addressed.
Besides the examples cited in the introduction, the model may be interpreted in
terms of innovation or R&D. Suppose that positive qualities represent innovating prod-
ucts and negative ones represent the classical ones. Thus positive θ would be the
“open-minded” consumers attracted by novelties while the negative ones the conser-
vative consumers favouring the well-known products. According to the importance of
the open-minded consumers relative to the conservative ones and the relative potential
for diﬀerentiation oﬀered on each type of quality segment, ﬁrms will either oﬀer only
innovating products, only classical products or both types of products. The impact of
the classical economic tools or organization modes of R&D may be addressed in this
special setting.
Having now in mind taste and nutritional quality, if the segment of positive θ is
not suﬃciently large relative to the negative one, no product good for health will be
sold on the market. Consumers attaching importance to health will be ignored and
will have to comply to the “majority rule”. Now imagine that preferences may change
depending on what is consumed or what is proposed on the market and in advertising,
i.e. the more you eat pastry or the more you see advertising spots on pastry, the
more you appreciate it. The segment of positive θ should in this case shrink everyday
and reinforce the ﬁrms’ choice. Thus consumers may be locked in an initial situation
favorable to taste and unfavorable to nutritional quality. This intuition may be tested
through a dynamical model, in which the consumers’ segment at one period depends
on the oﬀer of products in the preceding period.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
First case: 0 < q1 < q2 ≤ q. In this case, only positive θ are served. The no purchase




















First order conditions and further calculations lead to the equilibrium prices and
the proﬁts given in the lemma.
Second case: q ≤ q1 < q2 < 0. Here only negative θ are served. Similar calculations
lead to the equilibrium prices and proﬁts2. Note that both prices and both proﬁts at
equilibrium are positive as qi < 0, θ < 0, and 4q1 < q1 < q2 < 0.
Third case: q ≤ q1 < 0 < q2 ≤ q. In this case, Firm 1 serves negative θ while Firm 2
2The lowest and the highest quality ﬁrms not playing symmetric roles, calculations cannot be
avoided in this case.

































Note also that both prices and both proﬁts are positive (recall that q1 < 0).
Two special cases must be considered apart. Suppose that qi = 0. In this case con-
sumers buy product i only when pi = 0. Thus πi = 0. Two subcases are possible.
When q1 < q2 = 0 at price equilibrium proﬁts are given by π1 = −
q1θ2
4 and π2 = 0.
When q1 = 0 < q2, at price equilibrium proﬁts are π1 = 0 and π2 =
q2θ
2
4 . Both subcases
amount to make qi = 0 in the formulae obtained in the third case.
Consider ﬁnally the special case: q1 = q2. A proﬁt destructive competition (` a la
Bertrand) occurs when qualities are equal, which amounts to make q1 = q2 in the
formulae obtained in the three ﬁrst cases.
Proof of Lemma 2. Three cases have to be distinguished.
First case: qj < 0.
The proﬁt of Firm i at price equilibrium writes in this case as:
πi =

   
   
4q2
i θ2(qi−qj)
(qi−4qj)2 if qi ≤ qj
θ2qiqj(qi−qj)
(qi−4qj)2 if qj < qi ≤ 0
qiθ
2
4 if 0 < qi
On the interval [q,qj] we calculate the log derivative of the proﬁt function w.r.t.
qi and we prove that the derivative of the proﬁt is always negative on this interval.
Hence πi is decreasing on [q,qj]. On the interval [qj,0], the derivative of the proﬁt has
the same sign as (−qj)(4qj − 7qi). Hence πi admits a local maximum at ˜ qi = (4/7)qj.
Finally on the interval [0,q], the proﬁt is always increasing.
Therefore, the best reply of Firm i to any qj < 0 must be either q, ˜ qi = (4/7)qj or
q.
Second case: qj > 0.
In this case, the proﬁt of Firm i at price equilibrium writes as:
πi =

    
    
−qiθ2









(4qi−qj)2 if (0 <)qj < qi
As in the ﬁrst case, we prove that πi is decreasing on [q,0], that it reaches a local
maximum on [0,qj] at ˜ qi = (4/7)qj and that it is increasing on [qj,q]. Therefore the
best reply of Firm i to any qj of its competitor must be either q, ˜ qi = (4/7)qj or q.
Third case: qj = 0.






4 if qi ≤ 0
qiθ
2
4 if qi > 0
πi thus reaches its maximal value either at q or at q.
Proof of Proposition 1.
1) (q,(4/7)q) is an equilibrium if and only if each quality is a best response to the other.
Taking the possible best replies into account, we must ﬁrst have π2(q,(4/7)q) ≥ π2(q,q)
to ensure that the best reply of Firm 2 to q1 = q is (4/7)q, which is equivalent after
calculations to q ≤ −12q θ
2
θ2.
Second we must have:
(
π1(q,(4/7)q) ≥ π1(q,(4/7)q)
π1(q,(4/7)q) ≥ π1((4/7)(4/7)q,(4/7)q), (1)
to ensure that the best reply of Firm 1 to quality (4/7)q is q. The ﬁrst inequality






Therefore (q,(4/7)q) is an equilibrium if and only if q ≤ −12q θ
2
θ2.
2) We now examine the couple (q,q). Similarly to the ﬁrst case, for this couple to be
an equilibrium we must have:
(
π1(q,q) ≥ π1((4/7)q,q)
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